the Curtis Company initiated ex parte attachment proceedings in the New York Supreme Court against property owned by Sugar and his controlled corporations. Curtis filed a detailed affidavit alleging that Sugar had fraudulently incurred a liability under the contract and was therefore liable to Curtis for damages in a cause of action for fraud and deceit. Curtis also claimed that Sugar had assigned, disposed of, or removed property from the state with the intent of deceiving his creditors. Pursuant to New York's attachment statute, 7 a judge granted the attachment order directing the sheriff to levy on the property requested, prior to the filing of a complaint against Sugar and without notice to him. 8 The statute permitted prejudgment attachment upon posting of a bond accompanied by an affidavit attesting to facts similar to those alleged by Curtis. 9 Sugar sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, arguing that the failure of the statute to provide prior notice and hearing deprived him of property without due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. A three judge court granted the relief, 10 ruling that a prejudgment attachment statute is invalid unless it provides either notice and hearing to the debtor prior to attachment, or an immediate postseizure hearing at which the plain- An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial action, where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants, when:
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid the service of summons, has departed or is about to depart from the state, or keeps himself concealed therein; or 4. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors, has assigned, disposed of or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to do any of these acts; or 5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or implied, has been guilty of a fraud in contracting or incurring the liability; or 7. there is a cause of action to recover damages for the conversion of personal property, or for fraud or deceit. 10. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires that a three judge court be convened to grant an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of any state statute. The decisions of three judge courts are directly appealable to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) .
The jurisdictional issues are fully discussed in the opinion of the convening judge, 377 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The single judge considered the novel question of whether Sugar was foreclosed from attacking the constitutionality of the New York attachment statute in federal court by his failure to defend Curtis' state court action against him on that basis. Id. at 1058.
tiff-creditor must prove the grounds upon which the attachment order was granted. Moreover, the court intimated that a postseizure hearing could not be substituted for preseizure notice and hearing when the "[plaintiff] has never had a legally cognizable, concurrent possessory interest in the property which it attached,"" and when the claim involves an element of intentional wrongdoing such as fraud, which is not susceptible of documentary proof in an ex parte proceeding.
Previous decisions of the Supreme Court 12 have indicated that a possessory interest in continued enjoyment is property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.' 3 Therefore, unless an emergency situation justifies a summary taking,' 4 or due process rights have been waived,"" a state 11. 383 F. Supp. at 649. The court's unexplained statement presumably refers to a transaction in which the creditor retains a security interest in goods sold, giving him a right to possession upon default. Perhaps the statement was drawn broadly to encompass other situations as well.
12. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (short term deprivation of household goods subject to vendor's lien constitutes deprivation of property); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (temporary deprivation of household goods subject to vendor's lien constitutes deprivation of property).
13. The exact nature of the interests which constitute property subject to due process protection is unclear. See 14. An important governmental interest may justify a summary taking. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure of vessel engaged in illicit drug trade was necessary to gain in rem jurisdiction); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (confiscation of misbranded drugs). However, the seizure must be directly necessary to secure the interest, there must be a special need for very prompt action, and the state must keep strict control over the exercise of authority involved. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-'92 (1972) . In the context of provisional creditor remedies, an ex parte hearing may only be justified in a truly unusual situation, possibly including one in which an attachment is necessary for a state court to secure jurisdiction, see id. at 91 n.23, or when "a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods." Id. at 93.
15. To be effective, a waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and ordered' 6 attachment of a debtor's property must be preceded by procedures which comport with due process. 17 Consequently, this article will be concerned with whether, in the context of prejudgment attachment statutes similar to the New York procedure, due process requires notice and hearing prior to attachment in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Mitchell. ' declared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute which permitted prejudgment garnishment of wages on a creditor's ex parte application without hearing or prior notice to the debtor. The Court distinguished the earlier precedents, noting that it was dealing "with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system," 21 the garnishment of which "may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." '22 In contrast to prior decisions, the majority and concurring opinions clearly indicated that due process protects the uninterrupted use of property. The fairness of the final adjudication of ownership rights does not adequately protect against a mistaken or arbitrary deprivation in the interim.
Speculation that the Sniadach rule was applicable only to necessities or to specialized property like wages was dispelled by the Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin. 23 The Court ruled that the definition of property protected by due process includes the uninterrupted use of goods within a debtor's possession, without limitation to necessities and independent of the fairness of final adjudication. 24 The Court noted that the central meaning of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner; to be meaningful, the hearing "must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. ' 25 Thus, in sweeping terms, the Court condemned prejudgment remedies involving provisional takings of property unless preceded by notice and a hearing "aimed at establishing . . . the probable validity . . . of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor." ' 26 Fuentes rejected the proposition that the protective features of the statute aimed at deterring arbitrary seizures could be considered in determining the need for a prior hearing. Although these factors would influence the form of the hearing required, the Court, consistent with earlier decisions, 27 refused judgment attachment of a debtor's property without hearing or notice to the debtor and without requiring an affidavit or bond from the creditor. 0 The Court noted that, unlike the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, Louisiana limited repossession to goods in which a security interest had been retained, 31 and required that a judge rather than a clerk issue the writ, 3 2 that the creditor's affidavit be specific, 33 and that an immediate postseizure hearing be held at which the creditor was required to prove his claim. 3 
30.
The Florida and Louisiana statutes are similar in that both require the creditor to file a complaint initiating a court action for repossession accompanied by an affidavit alleging the right to possession of the property; both require the creditor to file a bond in an amount exceeding the value of the property; both permit the debtor to regain possession within several days by posting a counterbond; and neither provide notice or a hearing to the debtor prior to the seizure. [Vol. 24:637 make the Louisiana statute invalid per se. Rather, by balancing the impact of these procedures on the respective parties the Court found that the Louisiana statute imposes a low risk of a mistaken or arbitrary deprivation on the debtor. This factor, coupled with what the Court considered a limited deprivation resulting from the seizure of household goods (a refrigerator, range, stereo and washing machine), convinced the Court that the debtor's interest did not outweigh "his inability to make the creditor whole for wrongful possession, the risk of destruction or alienation if notice and a prior hearing are supplied.1 3 5 In holding that notice and hearing need not be provided prior to every deprivation of property, the Court seemed to employ a different mode of analysis from that used in Fuentes. In Fuentes, once it was decided that due process applied, the Court would balance interests to determine the form of the hearing, but required a prior hearing of some kind as a matter of cone stitutional principle. 3 6 But in Mitchell, while not disputing the applicability of due process protection, the Court nonetheless balanced interests to determine not just the form of the hearing, but whether a hearing was necessary at all prior to the provisional taking. Since Fuentes broadly asserted that a temporary interruption of use constitutes a deprivation of a protected interest, which without a prior hearing could not be constitutional under any circumstances short of a compelling state need, it is fair to say that Mitchell overruled Fuentes to that extent. 37 Moreover, in weighing the impact of the deprivation, the Court in Mitchell assessed the relative importance of the property to the debtor, an undertaking which the Fuentes Court explicitly eschewed. The dissenting Justices argued that the distinctions drawn between the Florida and Louisiana procedures were "constitutionally indistinguishable" 38 Thus it is apparent that some but not all prejudgment attachment procedures comport with due process without preseizure notice and hearing. However, given the failure of the Mitchell majority to explicitly overrule Fuentes or to establish an objective standard for determining the scope of due process, lower courts are likely to experience difficulty in gleaning a constitutional standard. The primary question facing the courts is whether 40 . See note 37 supra. Justices White and Powell apparently believe that due process does not require a prior hearing in every case, but that statutes must draw a proper balance between the creditor's and debtor's respective interests to minimize the possibility of arbitrary deprivation. Justice White may lean more toward the Fuentes rule than Justice Powell, who would limit Fuentes to its facts. Since Justice White dissented in Fuentes, his adherence to Fuentes in Mitchell and in North Georgia Finishing must be attributable either to a change of mind or deference to the principle of stare decisis. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., supra at 723-26 (Powell, J., concurring); Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 99-103 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court may proceed with a case-by-case analysis, with Justice White often casting the deciding vote.
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Mitchell provides a narrow exception to the general rule of Fuentes, or whether it is Fuentes that has been limited to its facts, and, therefore, whether the validity of each statutory scheme will hinge upon a judicial balancing of the risks and deprivations imposed upon each party.
II. Sugar: Mitchell CONSTRUED
Procedurally, the New York statute is strikingly similar to the Louisiana statute considered in Mitchell. The Sugar court found that the New York statute contained four of the five procedural elements which the Supreme Court cited in Mitchell as making prior notice and hearing unnecessary. 43 However, the court found that the availability of an immediate postseizure hearing which required the debtor to prove the grounds for possession was critical to the Mitchell holding. The absence of such a hearing under the New York statute 44 rendered Mitchell distinguishable and the statute unconstitutional under the broad Fuentes rule. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff's lack of a preexisting legal interest in the property and the fact that the validity of his fraud claim hinged upon proof of subjective elements of motive and intent were additional factors which brought the New York statute "within the Fuentes rather than the Mitchell zone." '45 As the court noted, Mitchell emphasized that the vendor's current, real interest in the property, and the susceptibility of the underlying claim to documentary proof, were considerations which weighed heavily in favor of the Louisiana statute's constitutionality. Clearly these three factors make the situation in Sugar distinguishable from that presented in Mitchell. Yet the court's analysis reflects a questionable interpretation of Mitchell.
The Sugar court began with the premise that statutes which do not provide a prior hearing are invalid unless they "squeeze through the narrow door of constitutionality left open in Mitchell." 46 The court did not undertake to balance the potential for a mistaken or arbitrary seizure against the impact of the deprivation on the defendant or the potential impairment of property value to the plaintiff's detriment, as the Mitchell Court had done. Rather, 
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the court mechanically compared the features of the Louisiana statute which had been weighed by the Court in Mitchell with those contained in the New York statute. Thus, it would seem that unless a challenged statute reflects the Louisiana procedural mix, the court would find a prejudgment attachment invalid in the absence of a prior hearing under Fuentes. The court did not explain its narrow view of Mitchell beyond stating that it was "guided both by the broad rule announced in Fuentes and Mitchell's insistence on the continued vitality of that rule." '47 Nevertheless, several factors justify the Sugar approach as a reasonable accomodation of Fuentes and Mitchell. First, as the Sugar court implied, Fuentes made clear that due process requires an opportunity to be heard prior to even a brief interruption in the use of property. To read Mitchell as other than a limited exception to this principle would undermine Fuentes, something lower courts should be reluctant to do in light of the Supreme Court's failure to clearly overrule Fuentes. 48 The Fuentes rule was announced in terms of a broad constitutional principle: the fourteenth amendment protects temporary deprivations pending adjudication, and the central meaning of due process is a right to be heard prior to that deprivation. Although the Mitchell holding seemed to contradict that rule, it failed to assert a different constitutional basis from that enunciated in Fuentes. Moreover, since Fuentes is part of a broader trend in recent years extending notice and hearing to protect against the arbitrary or mistaken deprivation of a variety of expectant interests, it is difficult to rationalize a view limiting Fuentes to its facts without similarly limiting a number of other precedents. 49 339 (1969) . Although a postseizure hearing was available in each of these cases, the failure to provide prior notice and hearing rendered the procedures unconstitutional. While it is true that the delay involved between the deprivation and the hearing was greater in most of these cases than under the Louisiana sequestration statute, the Fuentes Court noted that even a three-day deprivation could not be constitutional. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972) . Moreover, the statutorily mandated administrative post-termination hearing required in Goldberg, supra, appears indistinguishable from that under consideration in Mitchell.
[Vol. 24:637 the new majority of the Court meant to do precisely that. 50 Yet Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia Finishing Co. read together do not signal a retrenchment so much as that a new and uncertain majority of the Court is groping for a constitutional peg on which to hang the exception it carved out in Mitchell. 5 ' Therefore, until the Court either explicitly limits Fuentes or expresses a constitutional principle which harmonizes Fuentes and Mitchell, it would seem more reasonable for lower courts to adhere to 'the Fuentes precedent, limiting Mitchell to its facts.
Second, although Mitchell appeared to utilize a balancing test, it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court intended such a test as a substitute for traditional due process analysis. Lower courts may be inclined to adopt a limited view of Mitchell, obviating the necessity of balancing interests in each case, especially in light of the Court's refusal in past cases to inject a balancing approach to determine the necessity for-as distinguished from the form of-a hearing once the applicability of due process has been determined. 5 2 Without a clearer statement by the Supreme Court, lower courts understandably will be reluctant to adopt a test which "appears to be a highly individualistic and impressionistic interpretation of the requirements of procedural due process, introducing an element of unpredictability not present since the Fuentes decision." 1 5 3 50. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), lends some support to this view. Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger found that a nonprobationary federal employee, who under the Civil Service Act could be discharged only for cause, had no right under the due process clause to an adversary hearing; the procedures established by the Act were the measure of his rights. Justices Powell and Blackmun thought that the expectant interest in continued employment is protected by due process, but that a balancing test must be used to determine whether an adversary hearing is necessary prior to termination. Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice White also agreed that due process protects the interest involved, and that whether a pretermination hearing is required depends upon a balancing of interests. Id. at 186-96 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975), in which Justice White wrote, "It also appears from our cases that the timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved." (emphasis added).
51. 
III. CONCLUSION
The broad rule of Fuentes, which required notice and hearing prior to every nonemergency seizure of property, has been limited by Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. However, the ambiguity of that opinion and the Court's subsequent reliance on Fuentes in North Georgia Finishing Co. leaves the extent of that limitation in question. The Court, moreover, has failed to explain these seemingly inconsistent holdings in terms of a constitutional principle. Thus, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will regard Mitchell as a narrow exception to Fuentes or proceed on a case-by-case basis. In either event, lower courts will find it difficult to adjudicate due process claims until the Court clearly restates its position.
Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co. seems to indicate that a state may not seize property for the benefit of a plaintiff who lacks a prior security interest without providing prior notice and hearing, at least when the plaintiff's claim is one which is not susceptible of documentary proof. Moreover, the court held that an immediate postseizure hearing is a necessary minimal requirement, an interpretation indicative of the court's view that Mitchell should be limited to its facts. Thus, Sugar demonstrates that, absent a clearer restatement of the Fuentes rule by the Supreme Court, lower courts may be inclined to regard Fuentes, not Mitchell, as controlling in most cases. In this event, state provisional remedies which do not provide for preseizure notice and hearing are likely to be held violative of the fourteenth amendment unless they duplicate the procedural safeguards outlined in Mitchell. Statutory prohibition of marijuana has been under intense attack for the last decade. Efforts by civil libertarians to repeal or alter the drug laws through the judicial process parallel the steadily increasing use of the drug by the public and the recent publication of scientific data concerning its physical and psychological effects.' Changes in marijuana laws have been 1 4 the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's marijuana possession statute on the basis of the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Although the constitutionality of marijuana laws has been extensively litigated, this case presented new questions of law.
Irvin Thorne and Walter Grady were charged with unlawful possession of marijuana in violation of District of Columbia statutes which impose a maximum of one year in jail and a one thousand dollar fine on conviction. 5 Prior to trial, motions to dismiss were entered by the defense charging that classification of marijuana as a narcotic denied the defendants equal protection of the laws. 6 After the District of Columbia Superior Court granted a hearing on the factual and scientific issues involved in this claim, the defendants' plea was supplanted by a charge that the penalties imposed by the statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The penalties for violation of § 33-402(a) are: "Except as hereinafter provided, a person violating any provision of this chapter . . . shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both." Id. § 33-423 (a).
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition
6. Section 33-401(n) of the D.C. Code provides in relevant part: "'Narcotic drugs' means coca leaves, opium, cannabis, isonipecaine, and opiate, and every substance not chemically distinguishable from them .... ." The defendants contended that marijuana was not a narcotic drug, and classification of it within the narcotic category was erroneous and in violation of the fourteenth amendment. But see People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971) , where the court held that classification of marijuana as a narcotic drug did deny the defendants equal protection.
The evidentiary hearing on the scientific issues was extensive, including an examination by the court of evidence produced by the latest research. 7 Following receipt of expert testimony and documentary evidence, the superior court found that marijuana was neither addictive nor harmful in either a physical or psychological sense. Using these evidentiary conclusions as a basis, and relying on the Supreme Court decision of Weems v. United States, 8 the court found the sentencing statute for marijuana possession to be an infringement of the defendants' eighth amendment rights. The basic rationale for the decision lay in the allegedly unconstitutional and unconscionable disparity between the innocuous character of the drug, as evidenced in the hearing, and the severity of criminal sanctions for its possession. 9 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed. Although the court took judicial notice of the continuing controversy surrounding marijuana, it failed to consider in detail the evidentiary conclusions of the lower court. Rather, it relied on the rule of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 10 that where legislation is based upon questions of fact that are "at least debatable," a court must uphold the legislation until such time as the falsity of the factual premises on which the statute rests is no longer disputed.' 1 The court added that even if it could consider the merits of defendants' eighth amendment claim, the defendants lacked the requisite standing to bring the claim since they had neither been tried nor sentenced under the statute. 2 Consequently, the Thorne opinion suggests that prior to substantive consideration of eighth amendment challenges to marijuana laws, the proven harmlessness of the drug must be demonstrated in conformance with the equal protection test of Carolene Products. This application of fourteenth amendment analysis to an eighth amendment case clarified the standard of evidentiary proof necessary for future reliance on eighth amendment claims by marijuana offenders.
The majority of federal case law involving marijuana focuses on the due process and equal protection aspects of the problem, while the eighth amend- [Vol. 24:648 ment has received relatively scant attention. This imbalance is due in large part to the fact that "cruel and unusual punishment" is a relatively undefined concept, 13 making an eighth amendment claim somewhat hazardous for the criminal litigant.
Efforts to change marijuana laws by arguing that the imposition of similar penalties for the possession and use of marijuana and supposedly more dangerous drugs such as heroin and cocaine violate the equal protection clause have met with little success at the federal level.Y 4 The argument advanced by the Thorne defendants was that the similarity of penalties for marijuana possession and other more dangerous crimes violated the eighth amendment. By resting their argument on the eighth amendment, the defendants sought to avoid case law contrary to their position. Although they were ultimately unsuccessful, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was confronted with the task of stating a clearer definition of the eighth amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.
I. RAISING THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT QUESTION
Because of the lack of modem precedent involving eighth amendment claims, courts are provided a significant opportunity either to extend or limit its application when drug defendants allege cruel and unusual punishment. The relative paucity of eighth amendment cases as compared to fifth or fourteenth amendment case law is probably due to the conceptually broader bases for argument under due process and equal protection than under cruel and unusual punishment.
14. Weems decision which is the leading federal case involving the length of prison terms and the eighth amendment.
Weems, a United States citizen in the Philippines during the American occupation following the Spanish-American War, was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor and permanent loss of significant rights for the crime of falsifying public records. 6 Upon consideration of the defendant's eighth amendment challenge to his sentence, the Court relied on two tests to uphold his position. First it considered the relative disproportion between the severity of the sentence and the gravity of the offense it was meant to deter."7 Additionally, it compared the penalty at issue with penalties for other crimes of commensurate or superior gravity. ' The key element in the Weems decision was the concept that criminal penalties must, in some way, be graduated to the severity of the offense.' This standard implies that it is the court's responsibility to determine the gravity of the offense in order to correctly ascertain the reasonableness of the penalty. Aside from the inferential identification of personal gain and harm to others as possible criteria, the Weems Court failed to enunciate any specific guidelines, but based its opinion on a wholly subjective determination of the relative gravity of Weems' crime. 16. Weems was sentenced to cadena temporal, a penalty in Hispanic law which carried a sentence of twelve to twenty years at hard labor and permanent loss of the right to vote, hold public office, and travel freely. Undoubtedly, the imposition of sanctions additional to the long prison term played a significant role in the Court's decision.
17. The Court expressed amazement that Weems was so severely punished and noted that the penalty "excite[s] wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime." 217 U.S. at 365.
18 20. A fundamental problem which is common to Weems and Thorne is how to decide whether one crime is more reprehensible than another. The Court in Weems did not directly address this complex question and kept its analysis strictly subjective. The defendants in Thorne argued that his crime was relatively innocuous when compared to other misdeeds carrying a commensurate sanction. The failure to enunciate guidelines in Weems left very little solid precedent upon which a court could base a reversal of a drug conviction on eighth amendment grounds.
[Vol. 24:648 employed by the court in Weems to some degree paralleled modern equal protection analysis, and thus might have invited consideration of fourteenth amendment case law contrary to the defendants' position. 21 Additionally, the lack of guidelines for judicial determination of the severity of the offense encouraged reliance on scientific evidence which was not wholly favorable to Thorne's contention that marijuana was a relatively harmless drug.
22

II. THE LACK OF CLARITY IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
Today, a foundation for any successful prosecution of an eighth amendment claim by one accused of a drug offense related to marijuana would have to include, at a minimum, two elements. There must be a direct attack on the constitutionality of the sentencing statute and the production of extensive scientific evidence concerning the nature of marijuana.
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Attacking the statute itself is essential because appellate courts will not overturn particular sentences imposed by trial judges, even if they think the penalty excessive, if the sentence is within the limits prescribed by statute. 24 Secondly, extensive scientific evidence on marijuana is necessitated by the stringent, though undefined, standards of proof required by the federal courts 23. Discussion in this section will be limited to federal case law on eighth amendment challenges to marijuana laws. The majority of state jurisdictions join the federal courts in rejecting fifth, fourteenth, and eighth amendment challenges to these laws. . 1959) , where the Tenth Circuit refused to overturn a 52-year sentence for a first offender, but noted, "Although this court, sitting en banc, is not of the view that these circumstances require a holding that the punishment is cruel and unusual, it is of the opinion that the 52 year sentence is greater than should have been imposed." Id. at 467. on this issue. 25 29 Thus the court failed to resolve the standard by which to determine when scientific evidence is sufficient to allow an active consideration of an eighth amendment claim.
The same issue was presented to the Fifth Circuit two years later when defendant Drotar appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana. The court noted that the deadlock between the defendant and the government in the debate on the scientific issues surrounding marijuana was "a fair indication of the status of scientific opinion on the matter at the present time." 30 On this state of the evidence, they reached the same conclusion as did the Seventh Circuit in Ward, namely, that there was insufficient evidence pointing to the benign character of marijuana to justify consideration of the defendant's eighth amendment claim. Although the court cited Ward, it failed to address itself to -the issue of when scientific proof would be of sufficient preponderance to establish, as an evidentiary matter, the unconscionable disproportion between penalty and severity of crime required by [Vol. 24:648
III. THE CONSEQUENCE OF Thorne
Thorne attempts to define what scientific evidence the defendant must establish in order for an eighth amendment claim to be considered under Weems. Absent a new Supreme Court decision on an eighth amendment challenge to the imposition of a lengthy sentence, Weems will remain the basic case law in that area. The problem common to eighth amendment marijuana cases based on Weems has been determination of the severity of the offense where facts and information necessary to this evaluation lie outside the scope of judicial notice. The scientific controversy surrounding marijuana is a prime example of such a subject. 3 2 The Thorne court neatly solved this problem by treating an eighth amendment claim against the marijuana sentencing statute as if it were a straight equal protection argument. The proportionality aspect of the Weems test lends itself very well to such an approach. Thorne's challenge could have been based as easily on the fourteenth amendment as on the eighth amendment. In fact, his original complaint alleged only equal protection violations. The application of the Carolene Products equal protection test may be due, in large part, to the difficulty of establishing a new test for an issue in constant debate at public forums.
Under the Carolene Products test applied by the court in Thorne, the government need only prove that the harmfulness of marijuana is at least "debatable" in order to defeat an eighth amendment argument based on Weems. 33 Without solid and irrefutable proof of the benign nature of the drug, a defendant cannot establish a favorable determination of the severity of his crime, and thus any valid contrast between it and the penalty he seeks to avoid is impossible.
The genesis of the Thorne decision is traceable to the difficulty of applying Weems where the severity of the offense is largely indeterminate. The problem is compounded in drug cases by the fact that the question of severity rests on the court's appreciation of voluminous and conflicting scientific data. Neither Ward nor Drotar eased the difficulty by providing rules to guide the consideration of the scientific evidence. The court in Thorne provides this framework by borrowing the Carolene Products rule for the fourteenth amendment and applying it to an eighth amendment case.
The long range effect of Thorne, if it is followed in other jurisdictions, will 32 . In Carolene Products, the Court regarded the physical effects of filled milk on human beings as outside the scope of judicial notice. Thus the factual issues in Thorne and Carolene Products, concerning the effect of a given substance on the human body, are very similar. 33. See note 10 supra.
be to nullify the eighth amendment as a tool to challenge marijuana laws. 4 Scientific debate concerning the physical effects and properties of the drug will almost certainly remain unsettled for some years to come. Questions within the quasi-scientific realm of psychology and drug use may well be contested for decades. As long as the government is willing to dispute a defendant's case with some basis in fact or expert opinion, that defendant will not be able to satisfy the equal protection test of Carolene Products.
IV. CONCLUSION
The eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment should protect all criminal defendants. Indeed, the ordinary defendant should not be unduly burdened in effectively presenting an eighth amendment challenge to an excessive prison sentence. Under Weems he need only convince the court that the severity of his sentence is substantially unwarranted by the gravity of his crime. It is the duty and province of the judge to decide how severe a crime actually is because most criminal conduct is not susceptible of quantitative evaluation. Rather, society and the judiciary must make a judgment within the subjective framework of morals, theology and ethics.
The Thorne decision effectively deprives the defendant charged with a marijuana offense of those eighth amendment guarantees enjoyed by almost all other criminal defendants. Thorne, and the cases prior to it, take the position that because the crime of possession is amenable to objective analysis in terms of scientific proof of the harmfulness of marijuana, courts are precluded from exercising their subjective judgment concerning the severity of the crime. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held, in essence, that it must be totally convinced that marijuana is harmless before it will overturn a prison sentence imposed upon one who possessed the drug. The degree of latitude inherent in the vague reasoning of Ward and Drotar has been largely swept away.
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment," though somewhat vague, is manifestly humanitarian, and a determination of degrees of cruelty is a [Vol. 24:648 moral, not an objective, judgment. Allowing matters of science and chemistry to preempt an essentially moral question is conceptually inconsistent with the import of the eighth amendment and will work to suppress the influence of the constitutional freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. The Thorne court had the opportunity to extend significantly the ambit of the eighth amendment in the area of drug prosecutions, but rather chose to limit it severely. Historically, the fiduciary duty of a trustee of a charitable trust has been clearly delineated.' Likewise, a generally settled body of law has evolved defining the responsibilities and liabilities imposed on directors of business corporations. 2 Nevertheless, in a charitable corporation, where areas of charity and business overlap, there is less certainty in defining the duties and responsibilities of the directors of the organization. 3 The rapid growth and influence of charitable corporations has left many "managers of corporate charity . . . without adequate guidelines for conduct." '4 And, despite critical commentary calling for the development of settled standards 5 and the continuing need for such development, there has been little concrete response to this problem.
A recent case in the District of Columbia, Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Na-tional Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,' involved one court's approach to defining the appropriate duty for directors of charitable corporations. The case was brought by purchasers of health services from Sibley Memorial Hospital, a nonprofit charitable corporation, 7 against a number of members of the hospital's board of trustees s and various financial institutions with whom the individual defendants were affiliated. 9 The plaintiffs originally sought to proceed on an antitrust theory, alleging that the defendants' 0 were engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize the financial services purchased by the hospital in violation of the Clayton Act." The court, however, refused to certify the plaintiffs as a class to bring the antitrust claim, certifying them only as to the claim of breach of trust.
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Consequently, the plaintiffs amended 'their complaint, alleging a conspiracy on the part of the trustees to enrich themselves in financial dealings with the hospital. Further, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants' actions constituted a -breach of their fiduciary duty of care and loyalty in the management of the hospital funds. Following trial on this complaint, the court issued a memorandum opinion ruling that while the conspiracy claim failed for lack of proof, the defendants were guilty of breaching their fiduciary duty toward the hospital. In reaching this decision, the court first had to define the nature of the duty owed a nonprofit corporation by a trustee,' 3 and then 8. For the purposes of this article, the term "trustees" will be used in referring to the position held by the individual defendants at the hospital. As noted by the court, this is the title prescribed by the hospital's bylaws and no legal duty is presumed to result from the use of the term. 381 F. Supp. at 1007 n.1.
9. The amended complaint named nine members of the board of trustees, six financial institutions, and the hospital itself. Prior to the trial, the plaintiffs dropped their allegations against four of the trustees and one financial institution. See id. at 1007. Table 1 , id. at 1009, details the individual defendants' relationships with the hospital and with local financial institutions. Two of the trustees were directors of a local bank, one was the board chairman of a stock brokerage firm and two were each associated with two local banks. Each of the trustees had also served on one or more of the hospital's standing committees.
10. "Defendants" will be used to refer to the individual trustees unless otherwise specified.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The practical effect of this resolution of the certification question was to restrict the relief that could be sought to declaratory or injunctive relief and to bar personal recovery by the plaintiffs for any damages resulting from mismanagement. measure the defendants' conduct against this standard. This article will address the court's definition of the fiduciary duty, the rationale offered in support of its definition, and the possible impact of this decision.
I. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
There has been little litigation dealing with the question of the duty owed by a director to a charitable corporation. This is in large measure due to the absence, generally, of any need to proceed individually against a trustee as long as the corporate entity continues to exist.
14 Also the very nature of charitable corporations tends to lessen the likelihood of litigation defining their directors' duty. 15 Moreover, in lawsuits involving the question of the duty owed by directors of charitable corporations, there has been little discussion of the possible choices courts have in defining the appropriate standard or the policy considerations underlying the various alternatives.' 6 Consequently, the majority of the analyses on the question of what duty to impose on directors of charitable corporations has come from various commentators.
Because of "a charitable corporation's obvious similarities to both a business corporation and a charitable trust," 17 discussion of the appropriate law to apply to a charitable corporation has focused on established corporate and trust law. One main drawback to this approach is that the principles drawn from the two areas may not be congruent and often are sharply divergent.' 15. For a discussion of the impact of the utilization of the corporate form by charitable organizations, see Karst, supra note 1, at 436-37, where the author pointed out that "in the typical case, no one knows who a beneficiary will be until the charity confers a benefit on him, and after such a benefit is conferred he has no right to expect further benefits, and thus no remaining interest in the charity's funds. However, a reading of the case reveals that the issue was whether the trustees had any duty at all. Hence, the court had only to find a minimal duty to resolve the question. Nowhere in the report of the decision is there any indication that the court recognized more than a minimal duty, nor was there any reason for the court to have addressed that question.
17. Karst, supra note 1, at 435. 18. Some areas where the principles of law are in conflict concern delegation of investment duties, mingling of funds, and self-dealing. In each area, there is a flat prohibition placed on trustees, while business directors can do all three within limits. See
The existence of two often conflicting sources of law has created a situation where there is little agreement as to the standard appropriate for charitable corporations. This has resulted in a split of authority, with some commentators favoring imposition of a duty similar to that of a business director, while others urge the adoption of the fiduciary duty expected of a trustee of a charitable trust.
The arguments in support of imposing a duty on directors of charitable corporations similar to or less stringent than that placed on directors of business corporations are based on two major considerations. First, the form and structure of a charitable corporation do not dictate a strict standard. Since charitable corporations are often large and complex entities, it is argued, directors of such corporations must be allowed to delegate responsibility to others, something trustees may not do. 19 Second, the role and background of the people serving as directors of charitable corporations necessitate the imposition of a duty similar to the one imposed on business directors. Persons serving as trustees generally volunteer their services, and yet their business experience and standing in the community are critical to the success of the enterprise. 20 The concern is that exacting too high a duty will discourage prospective trustees from offering their services.
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While those who advocate applying the standard of a business director tend to emphasize the corporate nature of a charitable corporation, those supporting imposition of the fiduciary duty of a trustee stress the charitable aspect of the corporation. The fact that the organization's essential purpose is charity is deemed critical. 22 By its very nature, a charitable corporation lacks many of the safeguards that protect those with an interest in business corporations. The absence of the profit motive and stockholders with a financial [Vol. 24:657 interest in the continuing management of the corporation decrease the control that can be placed on the director's activity. 2 3 At the same time, the charitable purpose of the corporation, by definition, implies a public interest in how the organization functions. One commentator, favoring application of the trustee standard, described the assets of a charitable corporation as "more like a trust res than corporate capital." ' 24 And, just as with a trust, the law must impose a strict duty in order to protect the beneficiaries of the charitable corporation since they are not in a position to fully protect themselves. To do otherwise, it is argued, would frustrate the purpose of the corporation by failing to serve most effectively the intended beneficiaries as well as the public at large.
Rather than recognizing charitable corporations as a separate entity and developing a new body of law directly applicable to the area, the general tendency has been to decide first if a charitable corporation is more like a business or a charity and then impose the law from the selected area upon the charitable corporation. This results in potentially conflicting standards and provides imprecise precedent for subsequent litigation involving directors of charitable corporations. What is called for instead is judicial examination of the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and an awareness that the directors involved acted with no clear standards for guidance.
II. THE Stern ANALYSIS
The Stern court evaluated the defendants' actions by first dividing the alleged breaches of duty into three separate charges: mismanagement, nonmanagement, and self-dealing. 25 Next, the court contrasted the standard a trustee would have to meet to be free of liability under each charge with the standard applied to a business director. The duty imposed on a business director was selected as the proper measure of the defendants' actions under each separate charge. In making these choices, the court tended to rely on prior case law and selected commentary rather than on its own analysis of the policy considerations involved in the case before it. The court noted that the "charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity," 26 
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lack of original analysis only adds to the uncertainty regarding the basis for the court's determination.
The court noted that both trustees and business directors can be found liable for mismanagement if they are negligent in their duties, but business directors must be guilty of "gross negligence" while a more stringent standard of care is imposed on trustees. 27 It was decided that "board members of most large charitable corporations fall within the corporate rather than the trust model ' 28 and should therefore be held only to the lesser business standard. This position was supported by a 1948 case decided by the Tenth Circuit, Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hospital Association, 29 and a report prepared for the Ford Foundation on the use of endowment funds. 30 Language in the Beard case does appear to suggest that directors of charitable corporations are to be held only to a business standard, 3 and the case has been cited elsewhere as support for this proposition."
An examination of the second authority relied upon by the court, the Ford Foundation report, shows that the authors reached the conclusion suggested by the court, but that in so doing, they also placed significant reliance on the Beard decision. 33 However, at least one commentator has suggested that the Beard decision may not represent a clear determination that the business standard is appropriate. 3 4 The Beard court showed no awareness of the alternatives available and applied the general corporate law of the state without distinguishing between nonprofit and for-profit corporations. Thus the corporate standard might have been appropriate in Stern if the court had determined that the organization at the hospital was structured so as to remove the trustees from responsibility for the day to day decisions and to impose greater burdens elsewhere in the organization. Moreover, a statement of this explanation would have shown that the court was aware of the competing considerations involved in finding a specific duty. Instead, the court took a more simplistic approach, and apparently blindly adopted the corporate model.
In defining the duty that had to be met to avoid liability for nonmanagement, the court emphasized the significant difference between trustees and corporate directors in relation to their ability to delegate responsibility for management of investments. Trustees "may not delegate that duty even to a committee of their fellow trustees," 3 5 while a corporate director has the power to delegate, even to persons beyond the board of directors. 3 6 This difference was important in Stern since the board of trustees relied on a committee structure to fulfill its responsibilities. Again, the court deemed the corporate rule more appropriate for directors of charitable corporations, citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts 3 7 and, again, the Ford Foundation report. It is interesting to note that the reference to the Restatement (Second) supports the position that trustees of charitable corporations may delegate responsibility. Nevertheless, it can be read to lend strong support for imposing a stricter duty analogous to the one applied to a trustee of a charitable trust. 38 The determination of the appropriate duty was perhaps most significant for ascertaining liability under the charge of self-dealing. Liability under the two other charges, mismanagement and nonmanagement, flowed directly from the failure of the board of trustees to use its committee structure to adequately manage the affairs of the hospital, 39 and the defendants would have been liable for such failings regardless of the standard chosen by the court. However, whether their activity 40 constituted self-dealing was directly dependent upon the standard chosen by the court. Trustees may be found liable for "mere negligence in the maintenance of accounts in banks with which they are associated" 41 while a corporate director is only required to "show 'entire fairness' . . . and 'full disclosure' of the potential conflict of interest" 42 to avoid liability. Again, as in the Beard case, the cases cited by the court as support for its decision to apply the business standard do 39. Standing as perhaps the most egregious omission on the part of the defendants was the failure to hold meetings of the finance and investment committees. These two committees were charged with responsibility for directing and overseeing the hospital's financial affairs and neither met from the time of their creation in 1960 until 1971. 381 F. Supp. at 1008.
40. The record included findings that the hospital had kept excessive amounts in checking and other low interest accounts in affiliated banks and that the board had voted to employ a brokerage house of which one trustee was chairman of the board. Id. not clearly show that those courts had chosen the business standard. In fact, the mixture of trust and business concepts in two of the cases suggests that the courts involved were not aware that they were applying a business duty as opposed to a trustee standard.
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III. THE BREACH AND THE REMEDY Having chosen to hold the defendants to the less strict fiduciary duty of a corporate director, the court turned to measuring the defendants' actions against that standard. As mentioned above, 44 the record contained sufficient evidence, particularly as to the board's failure to oversee the hospital's business dealings, to establish a breach of fiduciary duty as long as the court held the defendants to a standard as stringent as that imposed on business directors. 4 5
While there is a diversity of opinion as to the proper duty to apply to directors of charitable corporations, there seems to be agreement that once that duty, however defined, is breached, a court has a full range of remedial measures at its disposal. 4 6 The plaintiffs in Stern sought to have the defendants removed from the board and the board enjoined from having any dealings with a financial institution, an officer of which was also a member of the board. Further, the plaintiffs sought a court-ordered accounting and an assessment of damages against the defendants. 47 While the court could have granted any or all of the requested relief, it seemed unwilling to punish the defendants and instead ordered only that the hospital develop and record a statement on investment policy and that all present and future trustees make full disclosure of any possible conflicts of interest. 45. In the area of self-dealing, the defendants argued for application of a standard even less stringent than that applied to a business director. 49 which was decided in the same court, before the same judge, and which has many similarities to Stern. 50 As in Stern, the main charges were mismanagement and self-dealing stemming from improper investment of cash assets in affiliated financial institutions. 51 While the defendants in Blankenship were held to the standard of trustees of a charitable trust and the breaches were more flagrant, the difference in relief granted is very striking. The court in Blankenship not only ordered the defendants removed as trustees and all financial ties with the interlocking bank severed, but it also awarded substantial compensatory damages to the plaintiffs, relief denied in Stern.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Stern decision defines for the first time in the District of Columbia the fiduciary duty that directors of nonprofit charitable corporations are legally obligated to fulfill.
3 .By announcing this standard, the court acted to put those who would serve in such a capacity on notice as to what might be expected of them. Certainly, the standard announced was not as stringent as it might have been, but the choice made by the court can be defended as necessary to insure the continued willingness of members of the community to serve in such positions.
However, there are a number of shortcomings in the case. First, since this was a case of first impression with potentially widespread impact, the court might have provided more by way of analysis and explanation. As one commentator noted, "there are all kinds of non-profit corporations, ranging from the small club to the large foundation . . .with all kinds of property holdings . . . . 54 This being so, it should follow that no one 49. 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971) . 50. While the Stern court did not directly distinguish the case from Blankenship, its treatment of the latter case suggests that it viewed Blankenship as a clear "trustee" case rather than one involving any question of the appropriate duty. 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
51. The individual defendants in Blankenship were trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund and officials of a bank affiliated with the union. The main claim against them was that they had misused the Fund's monies and had maintained excessive amounts in checking and other low interest accounts in the affiliated bank.
52. standard will be directly applicable in each situation. While the result in Stern may have been the most appropriate given the circumstances of the case, 5 5 a more detailed analysis would have laid a foundation for use by courts in the future in determining the appropriate fiduciary duty owed to a charitable corporation. The type of relief granted also raises questions regarding the court's decision. Again, while the relief granted may have been dictated by particular factors in this case, 5 6 the lack of any indication that personal recovery might be appropriate in similar situations can only discourage further litigation. This is particularly troublesome since, as the court noted, persons with potential conflicts of interest, similar to those of the defendants, will likely be asked to serve on boards of trustees in the future. 57 Moreover, the inability of part-time volunteers to adequately direct the business affairs of the hospital without additional assistance will not change. 58 The granting of some measure of relief might have served to insure that interested persons would monitor the affairs of the hospital and bring suit to correct discrepancies should any arise in the future. As matters now stand, a duty has been announced. However, the duty represents a relatively light standard of conduct and unless a future decision provides more significant relief, it is unlikely that many will assume the burden of seeking its judicial enforcement.
William E. Brew
55. The court was most concerned with the failure of the board to oversee the financial affairs of the hospital and this failing was not limited to the defendant trustees. Since the court was not clearly convinced that the defendants were guilty of serious selfdealing, see 381 F. Supp. at 1016, it may have been unwilling to impose too strict a standard by which to measure the defendants' liability, especially since they represented only a portion of the board.
56. The court noted that it did not appear that any of the defendants had profited at the expense of the hospital and in fact, "the overall operation of the Hospital in terms of low costs, efficient services and quality patient care has been superior." 381 F. Supp. at 1018. This factor, coupled with the advancing age and imminent retirement of the trustees, may have dictated the weight of the relief granted. See id. at 1019. 57. "[N]ew trustees must come to the Board of this Hospital, some of whom will be affiliated with banks, savings and loan associations and other financial institutions." Id. at 1019.
58. As the opinion notes, the financial affairs at the hospital were managed almost entirely by a Mr. Ernst, the hospital treasurer, until his death in 1972. Id. at 1008. [Vol. 24:657
